Reps. Lofgren, Raskin, & Dem Colleagues Demand Answers about Tulsi Gabbard’s Newly-Revealed, Trump Loyalty-Focused Spy Team

WASHINGTON, DC – Today, U.S. Representatives Zoe Lofgren (CA-18), a longtime privacy advocate, Jamie Raskin (MD-08), Ranking Member of the House Judiciary Committee, Mike Thompson (CA-04), Hank Johnson, Jr. (GA-04), Jasmine Crockett (TX-30), and Dave Min (CA-47) demanded an investigation into the full scope and legality of Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard’s reported Trump loyalty-focused spy team, dubbed the “Director’s Initiatives Group.”

“We are deeply alarmed by reports that a [special team] is seeking to collect and centralize sensitive communications from across the intelligence community, including internal emails, chat logs, and potentially classified systems,” wrote the Members.

The lawmakers specifically demand a briefing showcasing preliminary findings by August 21, 2025 and a report upon the conclusion of the requested investigation.

They note that, “the reporting raises concerns that this effort may be targeting analysts viewed as disloyal to the Trump Administration, including those who worked under previous administrations, and could result in the political screening of career intelligence professionals.”

Full text of the letter follows and can be downloaded here. 

The Honorable Tamara Johnson
Inspector General
Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)
Washington, D.C. 20511

Dear Acting Inspector General Johnson,

We write regarding troubling new reporting in the Washington Post¹, which describes a previously undisclosed effort by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to access and analyze internal intelligence community communications.

According to the article, a special team created by DNI Tulsi Gabbard, the Director’s Initiatives Group (DIG), has sought access to emails and chat logs across multiple U.S. intelligence agencies. The reporting raises concerns that this effort may be targeting analysts viewed as disloyal to the Trump Administration, including those who worked under previous administrations, and could result in the political screening of career intelligence professionals. The effort reportedly includes plans to use AI tools to aggregate a massive amount of sensitive data, including information on U.S. persons.

We are deeply alarmed by reports that a DIG is seeking to collect and centralize sensitive communications from across the intelligence community, including internal emails, chat logs, and potentially classified systems. We are even more troubled by allegations that this data will be scanned using AI tools of unreliable effectiveness to identify so-called disloyalty. This does not appear to be a legitimate national security initiative and reflects a deeply concerning attempt to politicize our intelligence infrastructure. It further underscores the urgent need for robust oversight, transparency, and safeguards to ensure that intelligence activities remain squarely focused on protecting national security, not advancing political agendas.

We respectfully request that your office investigate the full scope and legality of this initiative, including the following:

1. What legal authorities or internal ODNI policies would permit DIG to access internal communications (including emails, chats, and metadata) across the intelligence community?
2. Has DIG accessed or sought to access any communications data of intelligence community employees?
3. What systems, classified or unclassified (e.g., JWICS, SIPRNet, Microsoft Teams, Outlook), has DIG accessed or sought access to?
4. Has DIG attempted to aggregate, or successfully aggregated, such data into a centralized system or database? If so, what data was included, under what authority, and what policies exist regarding retention of this data?
5. Has DIG accessed or queried any information derived from FISA Section 702 or Executive Order 12333 authorities, either directly or indirectly?
6. Have any entities, including ODNI, made estimates regarding the number of U.S. person communications accessed, queried, or retained over the course of DIG's work?
7. Has DIG attempted to search, or searched for the communications of specific U.S. persons without a warrant or emergency authorization? If so, please provide details.
8. What contractor technologies, including those provided by Mojave Research Inc., are being used in connection with this effort, and what oversight mechanisms are in place for their deployment?
9. What safeguards are in place to ensure that AI technologies do not inadvertently integrating data sources that are required to remain separate, thereby preventing unauthorized access to sensitive or compartmented information?
10. Has ODNI conducted any Privacy Impact Assessments, civil liberties reviews, or internal legal analysis related to DIG’s activities? If so, please provide copies.
11. What policies govern the retention, access, and use of communications data or metadata reviewed or collected by DIG?
12. Has any intelligence community employee or contractor been subject to personnel action, reassignment, or disciplinary review as a result of DIG's activities? If so, please provide a summary.
13. Has your office received any whistleblower complaints or internal concerns related to DIG’s work?

We respectfully request a briefing on your preliminary findings within 30 days and a written report upon conclusion of your investigation. We also request that your report be made available to the relevant congressional committees and, to the extent practicable, released to the public.

Thank you for your attention to this matter. 

^[1] Aaron Schaffer, Ellen Nakashima, and Warren P. Strobel, Gabbard’s Team Has Sought Spy Agency Data to Enforce Trump’s Agenda, Wash. Post (July 8, 2025), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/07/08/gabbard-dig-odni-weaponization-intelligence/.

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